The 2017 Grenfell Tower tragedy fundamentally transformed the UK’s approach to fire safety and Building Regulations, most notably through the Building Safety Act (BSA).
The BSA introduced a new regulatory framework, establishing the Building Safety Regulator (BSR) to oversee the process, which has resulted in several positive outcomes, including: more comprehensive documentation and detailed initial planning; improved consistency through standardised processes; better audit trails for design decisions; and less reliance on approving authorities for developing design solutions. There are now also mandatory competency assessments for decision-makers, clear ownership of decisions, improved inspection regimes, and earlier involvement of building owners and operators in the design process.
Beneath these improvements, however, lies a complex reality. The new system has created significant challenges for the industry that may, ultimately, undermine its effectiveness. A new report by Ashton Fire, Olympian Homes and RG Group examines these unintended consequences in depth.
The compression effect on design phases
A major change under the BSA is the introduction of the Gateway procedure, with three mandatory review points during the design, construction and completion of high-risk residential buildings. Gateway 2 has proven particularly problematic, imposing a mandatory 12-week review period, during which construction cannot commence.
In reality, applications are taking, on average, 34% longer (16.3 weeks) than the stated period, with many taking longer. This has created the risk of developers and clients compressing design timelines to maintain project viability, and rushed decision-making. There is also the issue of professionals defaulting to overly conservative solutions and design teams caught between obligations and practical constraints.
Communication vacuum
Pre-Grenfell, building design approvals involved ongoing collaboration between stakeholders. The BSR process has dismantled these traditional channels of communication, replacing them with more rigid and formalised outcomes.
The BSR has explicitly stated it will not assist applicants by issuing advice or guidance on applications. This communication vacuum has increased the risk of misunderstandings regarding interpretation of fire-design guidance, and protracted back-and-forth exchanges that could have been resolved through discussion.
The path forward acknowledges the merits of previous practices and current shortcomings
There is a higher likelihood of mistakes and oversights, and a reduced capacity to develop innovative solutions to complex design challenges that support sustainability goals. The resolution of issues is also slower and costlier.
Resource constraints have compounded these problems. With the BSR struggling to employ essential technical staff, it is outsourcing application reviews to multidisciplinary teams (MDTs), the assembly of which has proven challenging, contributing to delays and inconsistent approaches.
The paradox of more documentation and less scrutiny
The increased volume and detail of documentation required for submissions, combined with compressed timelines, creates the risk of critical details being missed.
Fire engineers are now expected to review detailed design documentation beyond their traditional remit, which primarily involves developing fire strategies that define key principles, rather than detailed technical reviews. This creates the potential for fire engineers shouldering greater professional risk, without commensurate increases in fees or time.
Over-reliance on guidance-based designs
One of Dame Judith Hackitt’s recommendations is to retain an ‘outcome-based’ approach, rather than defaulting to prescriptive requirements. However, BSR Gateway 2 responses reveal a tendency to treat guidance as mandatory requirements, rather than tools for achieving compliance with broader regulatory objectives. This undermines the flexibility needed for complex projects and stifles innovation.
By focusing narrowly on adherence to specific prescriptive elements, the opportunity to assess safety strategies holistically risks being lost.
Economic impact
The BSA Gateway system has transformed development economics by requiring extensive upfront investment before securing site acquisition and funding. This frontloading of costs creates significant commercial risk, making some projects unviable.
Gateway 3 presents perhaps the most critical challenge, occurring at a time of maximum financial exposure before developers receive income. The delays already experienced at Gateway 2 extend the period during which they must service debt without offsetting income.
Additional challenges include practical completion concepts becoming largely obsolete without contractual frameworks for Gateway 3, and difficulty defining responsibility for delays beyond the statutory period. There is also uncertainty about the administration of design changes during construction and additional insurance risks during the registration period before occupation.
Future uncertainty
The UK government’s response to the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 2 Report accepts all 58 recommendations, outlining numerous further reforms. These include the creation of a new Super Regulator by 2028 and a licensing system for contractors undertaking high-risk buildings.
While well intentioned, these changes create further uncertainty in a sector struggling with a paradigm shift in construction processes. The responses prioritise consultation and review over decisive action, potentially contradicting the government’s wider economic aims, including the delivery of more housing.
The legacy of Grenfell demands substantive improvements to fire safety in building design, but these must be evaluated by practical outcomes, rather than just the breadth of oversight. A more strategic approach is needed, with enhanced focus on existing building stock, where risks are demonstrably higher. Several improvements to the current system would support the practicality and effectiveness of the desired intentions (see panel, ‘Proposals to improve the system’).
Proposals to improve the system
- Create improved communication channels between all stakeholders
- Reconsider the timelines of the approval process
- Emphasise the distinction between guidance and regulatory requirements
- Define competency frameworks, with robust checking systems
- Formally define the roles of principal designers and fire engineers
- Implement a Gateway 2 pre-application period with early MDT formation
- Establish a publicly accessible database of decisions
- Acknowledge progress already made in fire safety standards
The path forward requires a nuanced approach that acknowledges the merits of previous regulatory practices and current shortcomings. Focus must shift from layering additional oversight towards implementing more efficient, outcome-focused processes that enhance building safety while supporting essential development activity.
The authors
- Michael Kinsey, associate director
- Harry McDaid, director at Ashton Fire
- Richard Goodwin, construction director at Olympian Homes
- Adam Crabtree, director at RG Group
To read the full report, visit here
